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Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b

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Texas Rules
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*** This document is current through September 21, 2011 ***
*** Federal case annotations: September 6, 2011 postings on Lexis ***
*** State case annotations: August 27, 2011 postings on Lexis ***

STATE RULES  
TEXAS RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE  
PART II. RULES OF PRACTICE IN DISTRICT AND COUNTY COURTS  
SECTION 1. General Rules 

Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b  (2011)

Rule 18b Grounds for Recusal and Disqualification of Judges 

   (a)   Grounds for Disqualification. --A judge must disqualify in any proceeding in which:
   (1) the judge has served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom the judge previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter;
   (2) the judge knows that, individually or as a fiduciary, the judge has an interest in the subject matter in controversy; or
   (3) either of the parties may be related to the judge by affinity or consanguinity within the third degree.
(b)   Grounds for Recusal. --A judge must recuse in any proceeding in which:
   (1) the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned;
   (2) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning the subject matter or a party;
   (3) the judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
   (4) the judge or a lawyer with whom the judge previously practiced law has been a material witness concerning the proceeding;
   (5) the judge participated as counsel, adviser, or material witness in the matter in controversy, or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of it, while acting as an attorney in government service;
   (6) the judge knows that the judge, individually or as a fiduciary, or the judge's spouse or minor child residing in the judge's household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
   (7) the judge or the judge's spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person:
      (A) is a party to the proceeding or an officer, director, or trustee of a party;
      (B) is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding; or
      (C) is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.
   (8) the judge or the judge's spouse, or a person within the first degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person, is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding.
(c)   Financial Interests. --A judge should inform himself or herself about personal and fiduciary financial interests, and make a reasonable effort to inform himself or herself about the personal financial interests of his or her spouse and minor children residing in the household.
(d)   Terminology and Standards. --In this rule:
   (1) "proceeding" includes pretrial, trial, or other stages of litigation;
   (2) the degree of relationship is calculated according to the civil law system;
   (3) "fiduciary" includes such relationships as executor, administrator, trustee, and guardian;
   (4) "financial interest" means ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however small, or a relationship as director, adviser, or other active participant in the affairs of a party, except that:
      (A) ownership in a mutual or common investment fund that holds securities is not a "financial interest" in such securities unless the judge participates in the management of the fund;
      (B) an office in an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization is not a "financial interest" in securities held by the organization;
      (C) the proprietary interest of a policyholder in a mutual insurance company, of a depositor in a mutual savings association, or a similar proprietary interest, is a "financial interest" in the organization only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the interest;
      (D) ownership of government securities is a "financial interest" in the issuer only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the securities;
      (E) an interest as a taxpayer or utility ratepayer, or any similar interest, is not a "financial interest" unless the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the liability of the judge or a person related to him within the third degree more than other judges.
(e)   Waiving a Ground for Recusal. --The parties to a proceeding may waive any ground for recusal after it is fully disclosed on the record.
(f)   Discovery and Divestiture. --If a judge does not discover that the judge is recused under subparagraphs (b)(6) or (b)(7)(B) until after the judge has devoted substantial time to the matter, the judge is not required to recuse himself or herself if the judge or the person related to the judge divests himself or herself of the interest that would otherwise require recusal.

HISTORY: Amended by Texas Supreme Court, Misc. Docket No. 11-9126, effective August 1, 2011.

NOTES:

Change by amendment effective September 1, 1990. The grounds for a judge's mandatory recusal have been expanded from those in prior Rule 18b(2).
 
Comment to 2011 change by G.O. 11-9126 The amendments to Rule 18b are not intended to be substantive.
 
2011 amendment, by G.O. 11-9126, Renumbered former (1) as (a) and former (1)(a) through (1)(c) as (a)(1) through (a)(3); rewrote the introductory paragraph of (a), which read: "Disqualification. Judges shall disqualify themselves in all proceedings in which:"; substituted "the judge" for "they" or variant throughout (a); renumbered former (2) as (b) and former (2)(a) as (b)(1); rewrote the introductory paragraph of (b), which read: "Recusal. A judge shall recuse himself in any proceeding in which:"; substituted "the judge" for "he" or variant throughout (b); renumbered former (2)(b) as (b)(2) and (b)(3); renumbered former (2)(c) through (2)(g) as (b)(4) through (b)(8); substituted "the proceeding" for "it" in (b)(4); renumbered former (3) as (c) and added "Financial Interests.", and "herself" and "her" in (c); renumbered former (4) as (d) and former (4)(a) through (4)(d) as (d)(1) through (d)(4); added "Terminology and Standards" in the introductory paragraph of (d); renumbered former (5) and (6) as (e) and (f); added "Waiving a Ground for Recusal." in (e); in (f), added "Discovery and Divestiture.", substituted "a judge" or variant for "he", updated references, and added "herself"; and made related and stylistic changes throughout.
 
PUBLICATION REFERENCES. --See  Texas Civil Trial Guide, Unit 5, Non-Evidentiary Motions;  Texas Litigation Guide, Ch. 110A, Disqualification of Judge or Counsel.

LexisNexis (R) Notes:
 
CASE NOTES                                   

 

1. Motion seeking a recusal/disqualification was properly denied because there were no grounds under Tex. Const. art. V, § 2 or Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b; moreover, just because the trial judge had recused himself in another related matter did not mean that recusal was again required; due to the fact that the motion to disqualify or recuse was filed after the dismissal of the case under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.003, the original trial judge did not err in considering matters pending in his court. In re Reger, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 3415 (Tex. App. Fort Worth May 8 2008).

 
2. Former husband waived his right to raise on appeal a claim regarding recusal of the trial judge where the husband failed to raise the issue by written motion before the trial court. Therefore, he had failed to preserve the issue for appellate review. In re A.T.M., 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 4018 (Tex. App. Tyler May 29 2009).
 
3. Trial judge did not abuse its discretion in refusing to recuse himself in a guadianship proceeding because there was some conflict in the evidence as to what transpired between the trial judge and an incapacitated person's wife's attorney, and there was no indication of partiality in the record. In re Guardianship of Speer, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 3108 (Tex. App. Eastland May 7 2009).
 
4. Although relator, a prison inmate, complained that the judge assigned to hear relator's motion to recuse abused his discretion in ruling on the motion without first conducting an evidentiary hearing, relator failed to demonstrate his entitlement to mandamus relief. The ruling on relator's motion to recuse was reviewable on appeal. In re McDuffie, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 6189 (Tex. App. Beaumont Aug. 14 2008).
 
5. Appellate court overruled the claimant's assertion that the trial court erred when it did not recuse itself, because there was no motion for recusal filed; the claimant waived his right to complain about recusal when he failed to file a motion to recuse. Burleson v. Sharp Image Energy, Inc., 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 8880 (Tex. App. Eastland Nov. 8 2007).
 
6. In an insurance dispute, an insurer argued that the trial judge should have recused himself because the trial judge was a witness in the underlying matter; however, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request because the trial did not make the judge a material witness. Yorkshire Ins. Co. v. Seger, 279 S.W.3d 755, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 4777 (Tex. App. Amarillo 2007).
 
7. Where a justice who wrote an opinion of a three-member panel of a court of appeals had been an attorney at a firm where another attorney briefly had represented a party in the appeal, Tex. Const. art. V, § 11 required disqualification of the justice because the knowledge of the other attorney at her firm had to be imputed to her. Although Tex. R. App. P. 16.1 does not contain the vicarious disqualification language of Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(1)(a), the same analysis was applicable. Tesco Am., Inc. v. Strong Indus., 221 S.W.3d 550, 2006 Tex. LEXIS 208, 49 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 448 (Tex. 2006).
 
8. Under Tex. R. App. P. 33.1, an appellant did not preserve for review her complaint that the trial judge was partial because the arguments on appeal did not comport with the arguments made at trial; at trial, she argued that the judge was partial in that she denied a motion for a change of venue under Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(2); on appeal she argued that there was a lack of judicial decorum and integrity in the courtroom. Gutierrez v. Hiatt, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 1747 (Tex. App. San Antonio Mar. 8 2006).
 
9. In a Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b recusal hearing in juvenile delinquency proceedings, it was not error to exclude evidence of the trial judge's conduct and rulings from the juvenile's brother's trial as irrelevant; any error was harmless under Tex. R. App. P. 44.1 because the excluded documents did not constitute evidence of deep-seated favoritism or antagonism toward the juvenile. In re J.W.A., 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 8435 (Tex. App. Austin Oct. 13 2005).
 
10. Trial court did not err in denying a wife's motion to recuse the trial court judge because (1) although she claimed that the Texas Constitution prohibited a judge from sitting in any case in which there might have been a pecuniary interest in the outcome, the wife mentioned no pecuniary interest in this case, (2) the wife did not explain how the judge's assistance in legal matters while in private practice, which were distinct from the current controversy, prejudiced the judge against her, (3) the only relationship evinced was a business relationship that did not require recusal, and there was no showing that the judge gained personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts involved in the wife's case, (4) the judge's alleged remark did not show deep-seated antagonism, and (5) the wife cited no cases that indicated that the court was to consider the totality of the alleged grounds when none of them individually were sufficient. Pasley v. Pasley, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 6680 (Tex. App. Amarillo Aug. 18 2005).
 
11. Court finds no cases that indicate that the appellate court may consider the totality of all the alleged grounds when none of them individually are sufficient for recusal purposes. Pasley v. Pasley, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 6680 (Tex. App. Amarillo Aug. 18 2005).
 
12. Trial judge was not obligated to recuse himself where the record did not indicate that the party seeking recusal filed a motion to recuse. Kaminetzky v. Park Nat'l Bank of Houston, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 952 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. Feb. 3 2005).
 
13. In a termination of parental rights case, the trial court properly denied the mother's motion to recuse the judge from hearing the case; a reasonable member of the public, knowing all the facts concerning the judge's meeting with an employee of the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (CPS), would not have a reasonable doubt that the judge was actually impartial. The testimony of the CSP employee, who was designated as an expert witness, established that the judge wanted to obtain general information about the CPS's adoption policies and procedures; additionally, her testimony established that the meeting did not relate to the specific facts of the case. In re F.A.R., 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 234 (Tex. App. Eastland Jan. 13 2005).
 
14. Inmate's recusal motion did not ask for recusal of any individual justice of the court, nor did it assert that grounds existed for the recusal of any individual justice of the court, pursuant to Tex. R. App. P. 16.2, Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b; the motion did not properly invoke the procedures governing recusal pursuant to Tex. R. App. P. 16.3 and was denied. In re Johnson, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 9157 (Tex. App. Amarillo Oct. 15 2004).
 
15. Where the losing party sought to have the authoring judge of the appellate opinion disqualified because an attorney in the law firm with which she previously practiced served as a lawyer in the instant case while the judge was practicing at the firm, the appellate court ruled that the judge was not disqualified because of a tangential association between the judge and the appeal; the association did not present constitutional or statutory grounds for disqualification and was unknown to the judge. F.S. New Prods. v. Strong Indus., 129 S.W.3d 594, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 9882 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 2003), reversed in part and remanded, Tesco Am., Inc. v. Strong Indus., Inc., No. 04-0269, 2006 Tex. LEXIS 208 (Tex. 2006) (unpublished).
 
16. Contention of a party that a judge was disqualified because she had been a lawyer at a firm during the time that a partner in that firm represented the opposing party and that Tex. R. App. P. 16.1 and Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(1)(a) required her disqualification in such a situation and that because the judge was disqualified from deciding the appeal in the matter, the judgment she rendered was a nullity and could not be given effect, was without merit because the standard under Tex. Const. art. V, § 11 for disqualifying a judge who had been counsel in the case did not incorporate the standard for disqualification set out in Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(1)(a). F.S. New Prods. v. Strong Indus., 129 S.W.3d 594, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 9882 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 2003), reversed in part and remanded, Tesco Am., Inc. v. Strong Indus., Inc., No. 04-0269, 2006 Tex. LEXIS 208 (Tex. 2006) (unpublished).
 
17. Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(1)(a) recognizes that a judge is vicariously disqualified under Tex. Const. art. V, § 11 as having been counsel in the case if a lawyer with whom the judge previously practiced law served as counsel to a party concerning the matter during their association. F.S. New Prods. v. Strong Indus., 129 S.W.3d 594, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 9882 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 2003), reversed in part and remanded, Tesco Am., Inc. v. Strong Indus., Inc., No. 04-0269, 2006 Tex. LEXIS 208 (Tex. 2006) (unpublished).
 
18. Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(1)(a) imposes an objective standard for judicial disqualification as applied to juvenile adjudications that does not require any showing of actual bias, harm, or prejudice, and under Rule 18b(1)(a), as applied to juvenile adjudications, the grounds for constitutional disqualification from hearing a case of a judge who was a former prosecutor are: (1) personal participation by the judge as prosecutor in any way, however slight, in the investigation or prosecution of the same case or of a case arising out of the same set of operative facts; or (2) supervisory authority by the judge as prosecutor at the time the case was investigated, prosecuted, or adjudicated over attorneys who actually investigated or prosecuted the same case or a case arising out of the same set of operative facts. In re K.E.M., 89 S.W.3d 814, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 7623 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi 2002).
 
19. Under Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(1)(a), a trial judge was disqualified from presiding over a mother's action for modification of a parent-child relationship, because the trial judge had been the law partner of the mother's former attorney during the time that the mother's former attorney represented the mother in the initial divorce action. The same matter in controversy was involved in both proceedings. In re O'Connor, 92 S.W.3d 446, 2002 Tex. LEXIS 108, 45 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 970 (Tex. 2002).

 
20. In a parental rights termination case, denial of the mother's motion to recuse a judge was proper because excerpts from the record showed an associate judge who was trying to clarify the facts in a permanency hearing and to ensure that the mother appreciated the gravity of her acts and omissions. The statements occurred a month before the trial, and the mother did not point to any evidentiary rulings made by the judge that showed bias. Gammill v. Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 3800 (Tex. App. Austin May 22 2009).
 
21. Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to recuse another judge presiding over defendant juvenile's case because the judge testified that her sentencing decision in defendant's case had nothing to do with the judge's acquaintance with the complainant's son, and defense counsel agreed that he never questioned the judge's ability to be fair and impartial during the adjudication and disposition hearing, "except when she pronounced sentence, because it was a lot more than what I thought that defendant was going to get." In re E.A.P., 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 1536 (Tex. App. San Antonio Mar. 11 2009).
 
22. Mandamus relief was not granted in a case where settlement funds deposited in a trial court's registry were released to an intervening attorney because there was no showing that the required procedures had been followed in an attempt to disqualify a trial judge. Moreover, no grounds were established for recusal. In re Waleed Khan, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 1001 (Tex. App. Beaumont Feb. 12 2009).
 
23. Denial of the motion of an apparent assignee of a property owner to recuse a trial judge in the assignee's action that alleged that a city had violated the terms of an easement granted by the owner to the city that allowed the city to construct and maintain a water pipeline on his real property was not an abuse of discretion where: (1) the mere fact that the trial judge owned a piece of property in the city was not sufficient to require his recusal; (2) with regard to the fact that the trial judge formerly served as the city attorney, the assignee did not present any evidence that such representation was in any way related to the matter in controversy under Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(2)(d); and (3) the fact that the trial judge was present, along with numerous other city, county, and federal officials, at the dedication of a United States Border Patrol station, which also happened to have entered into an agreement with the city for the provision of water, did not provide a reasonable basis to question the trial judge's impartiality. Scown v. City of Alpine, 271 S.W.3d 380, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 8565 (Tex. App. El Paso 2008).
 
24. In a probate proceeding, because a trial judge did not show why he recused himself under Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b, a sanctions order was not void; nothing in the record established that the reason for the recusal was based on a relationship outlined in Tex. Const. art. V, § 11. In re Estate of Sookma, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 5053 (Tex. App. Fort Worth July 3 2008).
 
25. Motion seeking a recusal/disqualification was properly denied because there were no grounds under Tex. Const. art. V, § 2 or Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b; moreover, just because the trial judge had recused himself in another related matter did not mean that recusal was again required; due to the fact that the motion to disqualify or recuse was filed after the dismissal of the case under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.003, the original trial judge did not err in considering matters pending in his court. In re Reger, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 3415 (Tex. App. Fort Worth May 8 2008).
 
26. Pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a(f) and 18b(2), the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to recuse a judge from hearing the appellant tenant's motion for a new trial because a laundry list of matters to which appellant was alleging that the judge was material witness was reviewed and it was determined that the judge could take notice of whatever he saw and heard in the ruling on the motion for a new trial. Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc. v. Lerma, 241 S.W.3d 584, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 6747 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi 2007).
 
27. Disqualification of a trial judge who entered a default judgment against a bail bondsman after he failed to appear at a bond forfeiture hearing was not required under Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(1) and Tex. Const. art. V, § 11 because the bondsman failed to show that the trial judge had a pecuniary or property interest in the subject matter of the litigation; the fact that the trial judge served on the bail bond board that had suspended the bondsman's bail bond license and had presided over cases involving a party in the past was not sufficient for disqualification. McKenna v. State, 221 S.W.3d 765, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 2022 (Tex. App. Waco 2007).

 
28. Trial judge did not abuse its discretion in refusing to recuse himself in a guadianship proceeding because there was some conflict in the evidence as to what transpired between the trial judge and an incapacitated person's wife's attorney, and there was no indication of partiality in the record. In re Guardianship of Speer, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 3108 (Tex. App. Eastland May 7 2009).
 
29. In a suit involving a dispute arising from a mortgage settlement, a visiting judge properly denied plaintiff borrowers' motion to recuse the trial judge under Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(2), for making intemperate remarks at a pretrial hearing of which no transcript had been made; on appeal, the court held that affidavits from witnesses to the judge's behavior did not reveal partiality by the judge or that he made demeaning remarks, only that he made a strong attempt to control courtroom procedure in the face of the borrowers' counsel's lack of cooperation on discovery matters. Trahan v. Lone Star Title Co. of El Paso, Inc., 247 S.W.3d 269, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 5936 (Tex. App. El Paso 2007).
 
30. In an action by heirs of a bailee to recover a portion of bond premiums from bondsmen, a motion to recuse the trial judge under Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a(f) was properly denied when the trial court's rulings constituted no proof of bias or partiality and the trial judge's employment under the bondmen's counsel, which terminated when she became a judge, was not a relationship that explicitly warranted recusal under Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b. Drake v. Spriggs, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 10657 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi Dec. 14 2006).
 
31. Appellate court affirmed the denial of a motion to recuse by appellants pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(2)(a) because appellants failed to present evidence of the judge's impartiality, bias, or prejudice toward any of the parties or their counsel. In re Estate of Trevino, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 5144 (Tex. App. San Antonio June 14 2006).

 
32. Appellate court rejected the bail bondsman's claim that the trial court judge should have recused or disqualified himself in a bond forfeiture hearing because the bondsman did not file a verified motion for recusal before the trial court as required by Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a, and thus waived his claim for statutory recusal; also simply because the trial judge served on the Bail Bond Board and had presided over cases involving the bondsman in the past, was not sufficient for disqualification under Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(1) because the bondsman was required, but failed, to show that the trial judge had a pecuniary or property interest in the subject matter of the litigation. McKenna v. State, 209 S.W.3d 233, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 9401 (Tex. App. Waco 2006).

 
33. In a case where a personal injury action was dismissed due to misconduct on the part of an injured party, a trial judge was not required to recuse himself under Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(2)(b) due to the injured party's act of actively campaigning against the trial judge during a previous election; there was no evidence of impartiality, personal bias, or prejudice on the part of the trial judge. Treis v. Swalberg, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 4497 (Tex. App. Waco June 18 2008).
 
34. Pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(2), the denial of the client's motion to recuse the judge was properly denied as there was no evidence of bias in favor of the law firm's legal counsel. Bustos v. Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt, P.C., 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 424 (Tex. App. San Antonio Jan. 23 2008).
 
35. Company did not establish that the judge held a bias against it, as nothing indicated any deep-seated favoritism toward the business owner; it was not obvious how many of unexplained recesses were due to hearings on other matters or how many of those matters involved the owner's counsel, one recess was taken to allow the company time to go through invoices, and another recess was given to enable the judge and court reporter to take a break. Legacy Motors, LLC v. Bonham, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 7530 (Tex. App. Fort Worth Sept. 13 2007).
 
36. In a suit involving a dispute arising from a mortgage settlement, a visiting judge properly denied plaintiff borrowers' motion to recuse the trial judge under Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(2), for making intemperate remarks at a pretrial hearing of which no transcript had been made; on appeal, the court held that affidavits from witnesses to the judge's behavior did not reveal partiality by the judge or that he made demeaning remarks, only that he made a strong attempt to control courtroom procedure in the face of the borrowers' counsel's lack of cooperation on discovery matters. Trahan v. Lone Star Title Co. of El Paso, Inc., 247 S.W.3d 269, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 5936 (Tex. App. El Paso 2007).
 
37. District court properly denied appellant's recusal motion because there was no evidence that the judge had any personal knowledge about the case, any prejudice against appellant, or any bias for the victim, despite the fact that the complainant in the sex assault case was referred to a women's center where the judge had previously been employed. Iles v. State, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 2171 (Tex. App. Beaumont Mar. 21 2007).
 
38. In an action by heirs of a bailee to recover a portion of bond premiums from bondsmen, a motion to recuse the trial judge under Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a(f) was properly denied when the trial court's rulings constituted no proof of bias or partiality and the trial judge's employment under the bondmen's counsel, which terminated when she became a judge, was not a relationship that explicitly warranted recusal under Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b. Drake v. Spriggs, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 10657 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi Dec. 14 2006).

 
39. In a case involving joint managing conservators, a trial judge did not err by failing to recuse himself sua sponte or upon a mother's untimely motion under Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(2)(c); despite being a father's former law partner, the judge was impartial enough to have heard the divorce matter, and the mother's attorney did not wish to seek recusal. Blackwell v. Humble, 241 S.W.3d 707, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 9725 (Tex. App. Austin 2007).
 
40. Insurers' claim that the denial of their motion to recuse the trial judge in a Stowers action against them was an abuse of discretion because, as the judge that presided over the underlying trial, he was a vital material witness in the Stowers suit and had personal knowledge of disputed material facts, was overruled on appeal because the trial judge's calling the underlying proceeding for trial did not constitute his participation as a material witness in the matter in controversy under Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(2)(d). Yorkshire Ins. Co. v. Seger, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 3348 (Tex. App. Amarillo Apr. 30 2007).

 
41. Appellate court rejected the bail bondsman's claim that the trial court judge should have recused or disqualified himself in a bond forfeiture hearing because the bondsman did not file a verified motion for recusal before the trial court as required by Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a, and thus waived his claim for statutory recusal; also simply because the trial judge served on the Bail Bond Board and had presided over cases involving the bondsman in the past, was not sufficient for disqualification under Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(1) because the bondsman was required, but failed, to show that the trial judge had a pecuniary or property interest in the subject matter of the litigation. McKenna v. State, 209 S.W.3d 233, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 9401 (Tex. App. Waco 2006).

 
42. Mother failed to preserve her bias complaint, because the mother did not file a motion to recuse or otherwise raise her claim of bias to the trial court. In re N.Q., 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 5634 (Tex. App. Fort Worth July 15 2010).
 
43. Because parties had not moved to recuse a judge, the court expressed no opinion on the matter of recusal. In re Wilhite, 298 S.W.3d 754, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 7745 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 2009).

 
44. Appellant, an individual, filed suit against appellees, the city, its police chief, and several police officers, alleging sixteen causes of action arising from the revocation of his community supervision, the judge who ruled on his motion for summary judgment was not required to recuse himself because he had developed a close working relationship with appellees during the time he was the district attorney; this alone was not a ground for recusal under Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(2)(a). Clark v. City of Tyler, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 7182 (Tex. App. Tyler Sept. 1 2010).
 
45. Defendant's motion to recuse a judge was properly denied because the judge's statements concerning defendant's alleged recklessness were not sufficient to create doubt as to her impartiality or bias, thus interfering with defendant's due process rights. The record did not support defendant's assertions that the judge found defendant's conduct to be reckless. Mitchell v. State, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 7105 (Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. Aug. 31 2010).
 
46. Trial judge did not have a direct personal or pecuniary interest in the case, even though the trial judge was named a party in the lawsuit, that would disqualify the trial judge from presiding over the case, because the trial judge's personal interest in the outcome and subject of the case was no more than that of every other jurist in the State of Texas, when the inmate's petition did not seek money damages, but instead sought injunctive relief prohibiting all judges from discriminating. Kennedy v. James T. Wortham [SIC], 314 S.W.3d 34, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 3895 (Tex. App. Texarkana 2010).
 
47. Trial judge was not constitutionally disqualified from sitting in appellant's case involving his allegations of fraudulent liens because appellant's "Constitutional Disqualifications" stated only general allegations of bias and prejudice and did not state at least one legally recognized ground for constitutional disqualification. As a result, the presiding judge of the administrative judicial district did not abuse his discretion by denying disqualification without holding a hearing. Drum v. Calhoun, 299 S.W.3d 360, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 6627 (Tex. App. Dallas 2009).

 
48. Part of the federal rule for disqualification matches the Texas rule for recusal that states that a judge shall recuse himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(2); because federal cases discussing recusal and disqualification often use the terms interchangeably, those cases are of limited guidance in interpreting Texas's rule for disqualification that does not include the appearance of impropriety as a basis for disqualification. In re Wilhite, 298 S.W.3d 754, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 7745 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 2009).

 
49. For purposes of Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(2), the record did not show that an attorney was a material witness, had committed malpractice, or that a judge had an interest in the subject matter, such that the trial court did not err in denying a motion for recusal or disqualification. Fuqua v. Oncor Elec. Delivery Co., 315 S.W.3d 552, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 2323 (Tex. App. Eastland 2010).

 
50. Ex-husband did not meet his burden to prove that recusal was warranted under Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(2)(a), (b), given that the cited comments indicated that the trial court judge was trying to facilitate the proceedings that deviated from issues relevant to the proceeding, and the comments were well within the realm of impartiality. Goad v. State, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 6349 (Tex. App. Austin Aug. 6 2010).
 
51. For purposes of Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(2), the record did not show that an attorney was a material witness, had committed malpractice, or that a judge had an interest in the subject matter, such that the trial court did not err in denying a motion for recusal or disqualification. Fuqua v. Oncor Elec. Delivery Co., 315 S.W.3d 552, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 2323 (Tex. App. Eastland 2010).

 
52. Trial judge was disqualified from hearing the termination of the father's parental rights proceeding, Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(1)(a), because the termination proceeding raised the same issues as the divorce in which the attorney at the judge's law firm represented the mother, including issues of the child's best interest and other aspects. In the Interest of D.C., 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 7825 (Tex. App. Amarillo Sept. 23 2010).
 
53. Record did not support the contention that either an attorney or a judge had any direct interest in the subject matter of this suit, plus the attorney did not serve as counsel to a party to this suit and the matter in controversy was not the same, for purposes of Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(1). Fuqua v. Oncor Elec. Delivery Co., 315 S.W.3d 552, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 2323 (Tex. App. Eastland 2010).
 
54. Judge is disqualified when two prongs are met: first, the judge or the judge's law firm was the attorney for a party in the case, and second, the matter before the judge is the same matter that was before the judge or judge's law firm; both prongs must be present for a judge to be disqualified. In re Wilhite, 298 S.W.3d 754, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 7745 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 2009).
 
55. If the court found that a judge was disqualified from presiding over an asbestos litigation against a company because his previous law firm represented the company in similar cases years ago, that decision would place every future judgment in peril because none of those judgments will be final until a party, post-judgment, conducts a full investigation for similarities between the present lawsuit and any lawsuits handled by the judge's prior law firm. In re Wilhite, 298 S.W.3d 754, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 7745 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 2009).
 
56. For disqualification purposes, the issue is not whether the cases have the same or similar pleadings, but rather whether they are the same matters. In re Wilhite, 298 S.W.3d 754, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 7745 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 2009).
 
57. Similarities between the prior lawsuits and the current lawsuit were insufficient to show that the three cases were the same matter in controversy for disqualification purposes, given that (1) the plaintiffs in the three cases were strangers and suing for their own personal injury, (2) nothing showed that the injuries arose from the same incident or same exposure to asbestos, and (3) in addition to suing the company, each plaintiff also sued different defendants, meaning each lawsuit concerned different liability theories and defenses; thus, disqualification was not necessary and the court denied mandamus relief. In re Wilhite, 298 S.W.3d 754, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 7745 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 2009).

 
58. While a trial judge was a named defendant and an inmate sought monetary damages in his civil rights action, the trial judge was not required to disqualify herself under Tex. Const. art. V, § 11, and Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(1)(b) in the instant proceeding because the pleadings did not set out a colorable cause of action for damages against the trial judge but merely alleged a vast, vague conspiracy. Kennedy v. Staples, 336 S.W.3d 745, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 1468 (Tex. App. Texarkana 2011).
 
59. Summary judgment in favor of the attorney, dismissing the claimant's fraudulent lien action under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ch. 12 was proper, because the justice court judge did not err by refusing to apply Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a, when Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a did not apply to justice courts, and the claimant cited no authority and presented no argument that the justice court lacked the authority to assess attorney fees against a litigant as a sanction. Merritt v. Davis, 331 S.W.3d 857, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 633 (Tex. App. Dallas 2011).

 
60. Presiding judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the inmate's motion to recuse the trial judge without a hearing, because the inmate's grounds for recusal were not valid, when even assuming the trial judge, former county district attorney, had worked with the county district attorney's office on previous criminal cases, this working relationship alone was not a ground for recusal. Clark v. Smith County Dist. Attys. Office, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 6204 (Tex. App. Tyler Aug. 10 2011).

 
61. Denial of a father's motion for recusal of his trial judge was not an abuse of discretion because although the father claimed that the trial judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned and that he had a personal bias or prejudice against the father's attorney because the attorney was a material witness in an investigation against the trial judge, the judge hearing the recusal motion was not required to believe the attorney's testimony simply because there were no other witnesses to contradict it. In the Interest of S.D., 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 7111 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth Aug. 31, 2011).
 
62. Visiting judge did not err by denying appellants' motion to recuse or disqualify the trial judge under Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(2)(a), (b) because appellants did not cite any specific passages in the record to support their contention that the trial judge made demeaning remarks during the trial, because the entire trial lasted less than three and a half hours and appellants cross-examined the other parties' witnesses the court could not say that the length of time the trial judge allotted to their case displayed a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism, and the trial judge's conduct during the hearing on appellants' motion for reconsideration was within the bounds of judicial propriety. Hansen v. Jp Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 4455 (Tex. App. Dallas June 13 2011).

 
63. Denial of a father's motion for recusal of his trial judge was not an abuse of discretion because although the father claimed that the trial judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned and that he had a personal bias or prejudice against the father's attorney because the attorney was a material witness in an investigation against the trial judge, the judge hearing the recusal motion was not required to believe the attorney's testimony simply because there were no other witnesses to contradict it. In the Interest of S.D., 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 7111 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth Aug. 31, 2011).
 
64. Visiting judge did not err by denying appellants' motion to recuse or disqualify the trial judge under Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(2)(a), (b) because appellants did not cite any specific passages in the record to support their contention that the trial judge made demeaning remarks during the trial, because the entire trial lasted less than three and a half hours and appellants cross-examined the other parties' witnesses the court could not say that the length of time the trial judge allotted to their case displayed a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism, and the trial judge's conduct during the hearing on appellants' motion for reconsideration was within the bounds of judicial propriety. Hansen v. Jp Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 4455 (Tex. App. Dallas June 13 2011).
 
65. Recusal was not warranted under Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(2) based on an allegation that a trial judge who made a reduced award of attorney's fees had a personal bias against counsel's firm, which previously had represented a client in unrelated litigation against the trial judge's father. The administrative judge reasonably could have concluded that there was insufficient evidence of the trial judge's animosity toward the firm. Pruett v. Harris County Bail Bond Bd., 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 2556 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. Apr. 7 2011).

 
66. Mandamus relief was not granted in a case where settlement funds deposited in a trial court's registry were released to an intervening attorney because there was no showing that the required procedures had been followed in an attempt to disqualify a trial judge. Moreover, no grounds were established for recusal. In re Waleed Khan, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 1001 (Tex. App. Beaumont Feb. 12 2009).

 
67. Former husband waived his right to raise on appeal a claim regarding recusal of the trial judge where the husband failed to raise the issue by written motion before the trial court. Therefore, he had failed to preserve the issue for appellate review. In re A.T.M., 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 4018 (Tex. App. Tyler May 29 2009).
 
68. In a case where a personal injury action was dismissed due to misconduct on the part of an injured party, a trial judge was not required to recuse himself under Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(2)(b) due to the injured party's act of actively campaigning against the trial judge during a previous election; there was no evidence of impartiality, personal bias, or prejudice on the part of the trial judge. Treis v. Swalberg, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 4497 (Tex. App. Waco June 18 2008).
 
69. Appellate court overruled the claimant's assertion that the trial court erred when it did not recuse itself, because there was no motion for recusal filed; the claimant waived his right to complain about recusal when he failed to file a motion to recuse. Burleson v. Sharp Image Energy, Inc., 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 8880 (Tex. App. Eastland Nov. 8 2007).

 
70. In a Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b recusal hearing in juvenile delinquency proceedings, it was not error to exclude evidence of the trial judge's conduct and rulings from the juvenile's brother's trial as irrelevant; any error was harmless under Tex. R. App. P. 44.1 because the excluded documents did not constitute evidence of deep-seated favoritism or antagonism toward the juvenile. In re J.W.A., 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 8435 (Tex. App. Austin Oct. 13 2005).

 
71. In a Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b recusal hearing in juvenile delinquency proceedings, it was not error to exclude evidence of the trial judge's conduct and rulings from the juvenile's brother's trial as irrelevant; any error was harmless under Tex. R. App. P. 44.1 because the excluded documents did not constitute evidence of deep-seated favoritism or antagonism toward the juvenile. In re J.W.A., 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 8435 (Tex. App. Austin Oct. 13 2005).
 
72. Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(1)(a) imposes an objective standard for judicial disqualification as applied to juvenile adjudications that does not require any showing of actual bias, harm, or prejudice, and under Rule 18b(1)(a), as applied to juvenile adjudications, the grounds for constitutional disqualification from hearing a case of a judge who was a former prosecutor are: (1) personal participation by the judge as prosecutor in any way, however slight, in the investigation or prosecution of the same case or of a case arising out of the same set of operative facts; or (2) supervisory authority by the judge as prosecutor at the time the case was investigated, prosecuted, or adjudicated over attorneys who actually investigated or prosecuted the same case or a case arising out of the same set of operative facts. In re K.E.M., 89 S.W.3d 814, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 7623 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi 2002).

 
73. Petitioner state inmate's habeas claim that the trial judge should have recused himself under Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b due to a direct conflict of interest in violation of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct, for formerly serving on the Children's Assessment Center judicial council, failed because recusal was not warranted in a sexual assault of a child case solely because the judge had at one time been on the Center's council, it was not alleged or shown that the judge had any direct involvement with the Center during the relevant time period, and the judge's statements in ordering consecutive sentences, that it was easy to decide to lock up the inmate for life, did not show recusal was required; there was no showing of improper motive or opinion derived from an extrajudicial source. Mendez v. Quarterman, 625 F. Supp. 2d 415, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47543 (S.D. Tex. 2009).
 
74. Appellate court denied the State's motion to recuse an appellate justice because the tangential statements filed by the justice on behalf of his client who was not a party to a separate civil suit were insufficient, as a matter of law, to warrant recusal from consideration of the State's motion for rehearing and motion for reconsideration en banc. It was in a capacity as an advocate for his client that the justice filed the documents communicating his client's belief that the civil suit between the political opponents was "politically motivated," and no showing was made that the statements represented the justice's personal beliefs rather than merely reflecting the beliefs of his client. Ex parte Ellis, 275 S.W.3d 109, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 9722 (Tex. App. Austin 2008).
 
75. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for recusal of a trial judge, under Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a(f), because a reasonable person, knowing all of the circumstances involved, would not have a reasonable doubt as to the trial judge's impartiality because (1) defendant's motion to recuse stated that the trial judge should have been subjected to recusal because he ordered extra security for the new punishment hearing as a result of a threat to the trial judge's life in the event that defendant was sentenced to the penitentiary; (2) although there were allegations that defendant's mother made the threat against the trial judge, no formal charges were ever brought against her and the record did not reflect that defendant even had knowledge of the threat; (3) defendant was not on trial for the threat against the trial judge; and (4) the fact that the trial judge requested additional security was not sufficient to rebut the presumption of impartiality. Tingler v. State, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 332 (Tex. App. Beaumont Jan. 16 2008).
 
76. Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(2)(a) does not require a showing of bias (partiality) arising from an extrajudicial source that is outside the judicial proceeding; rather, when judicial conduct or remarks serve as the basis for a recusal motion, the movant is required to show a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. Kniatt v. State, 239 S.W.3d 910, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 9522 (Tex. App. Waco 2007).
 
77. Under Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(2)(b), the movant must show that the judge's possession of personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts either was wrongfully obtained or led to a wrongful disposition of the case; an unfavorable predisposition towards a party arising from events occurring during judicial proceedings may nonetheless support recusal if it is so extreme as to display a clear inability to render fair judgment. Kniatt v. State, 239 S.W.3d 910, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 9522 (Tex. App. Waco 2007).
 
78. Per se extrajudicial-source rule should not have been applied in denying a motion to recuse a pretrial judge from hearing a habeas corpus application based on events at the pretrial hearing because defendant's motion to recuse involved questioned-impartiality and personal-knowledge claims under Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(2)(a) and the second part of Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(2)(b). Kniatt v. State, 239 S.W.3d 910, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 9522 (Tex. App. Waco 2007).
 
79. Denial of habeas corpus relief and denial of motion to recuse was affirmed because the petitioner failed to demonstrate an extrajudicial source of the trial judge's alleged impartiality, and failed to show that the trial judge obtained personal information from an extrajudicial source pertaining to the proceedings, as the extrajudicial source rule applied to Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(2)(b) personal knowledge claims. Kniatt v. State, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 5141 (Tex. App. Waco June 27 2007).
 
80. There was no abuse of discretion, under Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a, in denying defendant's Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b motion to recuse a trial judge, which complained about comments the judge made in the course of the judge's supervision of defendant in a substance abuse program, because defendant was ordered to complete a substance abuse program as a condition of his community supervision, and determining compliance with a condition for community supervision was not extrajudicial. Kimball v. State, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 4074 (Tex. App. Beaumont May 23 2007).
 
81. Defendant was not entitled to recuse the judge pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b because the judge, in waiting until after the lunch break in defendant's theft trial to allow defendant to obtain medical attention, reasonably thought that defendant's eye condition was not serious. Finley v. State, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 1928 (Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. Mar. 13 2007).
 
82. Under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 30.01, a judge was disqualified from presiding over prosecution for a terroristic threat because the judge was the target of the threat; reversible error occurred because she performed the discretionary act of excusing jurors before recusing herself, as required by Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(2)(a). Burkett v. State, 196 S.W.3d 892, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 5786 (Tex. App. Texarkana 2006).
 
83. Where defendant filed a purported motion for mandatory constitutional disqualification based on the trial judge's alleged partiality toward the state and personal bias and prejudice against defendant, these were grounds for recusal under Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b, not for constitutional disqualification under Tex. Const. art. V, § 11; therefore, defendant's motion for disqualification that was filed on the day before a hearing was not timely filed 10 days before the date set for trial or other hearing as required by Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a(a), and the failure to comply with the notice provision barred complaint on appeal that denial of a separate hearing before another judge on the motion to recuse entitled defendant to a new trial. Bowles v. State, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 6311 (Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. Sept. 13 2001).
 
84. Defendant's motion to recuse a judge was properly denied because the judge's statements concerning defendant's alleged recklessness were not sufficient to create doubt as to her impartiality or bias, thus interfering with defendant's due process rights. The record did not support defendant's assertions that the judge found defendant's conduct to be reckless. Mitchell v. State, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 7105 (Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. Aug. 31 2010).
 
85. Defendant's motion to recuse the judge was properly denied under Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a, 18b because the record did not support the assertion that the judge's knowledge of the case stemmed from extra-judicial sources, but rather that the judge formed an opinion as to punishment based on the specific facts of the case; the judge's comments were not enough to create doubt as to the judge's impartiality. Wallace v. State, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 5086 (Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. July 6 2010).
 
86. Although a trial judge stated in a drunk driving case that the only plea bargain he would accept would be for the maximum sentence, the recusal judge reasonably found that the trial judge was unbiased. In light of defendant's repeated attempts to drink and drive while he was on bond, the comment was not arbitrary, and it appeared to be only an expression of impatience with defendant's indecision about whether to plead. Gaal v. State, 332 S.W.3d 448, 2011 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 284 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

 
87. In a trial for driving while intoxicated, the trial judge should have been recused under Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b because he exceeded his general authority to reject plea bargains when, after initially considering a plea bargain for the minimum term of confinement, he reacted to defendant's decision not to plead by foreclosing the possibility of any plea bargain other than one for the 10-year maximum punishment. Gaal v. State, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 612 (Tex. App. Fort Worth Jan. 28 2010).

 
88. Under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 30.01, a judge was disqualified from presiding over prosecution for a terroristic threat because the judge was the target of the threat; reversible error occurred because she performed the discretionary act of excusing jurors before recusing herself, as required by Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(2)(a). Burkett v. State, 196 S.W.3d 892, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 5786 (Tex. App. Texarkana 2006).

 
89. Where defendant filed a purported motion for mandatory constitutional disqualification based on the trial judge's alleged partiality toward the state and personal bias and prejudice against defendant, these were grounds for recusal under Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b, not for constitutional disqualification under Tex. Const. art. V, § 11; therefore, defendant's motion for disqualification that was filed on the day before a hearing was not timely filed 10 days before the date set for trial or other hearing as required by Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a(a), and the failure to comply with the notice provision barred complaint on appeal that denial of a separate hearing before another judge on the motion to recuse entitled defendant to a new trial. Bowles v. State, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 6311 (Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. Sept. 13 2001).

 
90. Having found error in the denial of defendant's motion to recuse, the court remanded the case for a new trial before a different judge, as permitted by Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(d) and Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b. Gaal v. State, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 612 (Tex. App. Fort Worth Jan. 28 2010).

 
91. There was no abuse of discretion, under Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a, in denying defendant's Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b motion to recuse a trial judge, which complained about comments the judge made in the course of the judge's supervision of defendant in a substance abuse program, because defendant was ordered to complete a substance abuse program as a condition of his community supervision, and determining compliance with a condition for community supervision was not extrajudicial. Kimball v. State, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 4074 (Tex. App. Beaumont May 23 2007).

 
92. Under Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(1)(a), a trial judge was disqualified from presiding over a mother's action for modification of a parent-child relationship, because the trial judge had been the law partner of the mother's former attorney during the time that the mother's former attorney represented the mother in the initial divorce action. The same matter in controversy was involved in both proceedings. In re O'Connor, 92 S.W.3d 446, 2002 Tex. LEXIS 108, 45 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 970 (Tex. 2002).

 
93. Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(1)(a) imposes an objective standard for judicial disqualification as applied to juvenile adjudications that does not require any showing of actual bias, harm, or prejudice, and under Rule 18b(1)(a), as applied to juvenile adjudications, the grounds for constitutional disqualification from hearing a case of a judge who was a former prosecutor are: (1) personal participation by the judge as prosecutor in any way, however slight, in the investigation or prosecution of the same case or of a case arising out of the same set of operative facts; or (2) supervisory authority by the judge as prosecutor at the time the case was investigated, prosecuted, or adjudicated over attorneys who actually investigated or prosecuted the same case or a case arising out of the same set of operative facts. In re K.E.M., 89 S.W.3d 814, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 7623 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi 2002).

 
94. In a divorce proceeding, the judge properly denied the husband's motion for recusal. Critical or disapproving judicial remarks generally did not support recusal, and manipulation of the record was not shown by testimony from the court reporter that she only recorded hearings when instructed by the trial judge and that at least two hearings had not been recorded. Sheshtawy v. Sheshtawy, 150 S.W.3d 772, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 8616 (Tex. App. San Antonio 2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 823, 126 S. Ct. 359, 163 L. Ed. 2d 67, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 6066 (2005).

 
95. In a termination of parental rights case, the trial court properly denied the mother's motion to recuse the judge from hearing the case; a reasonable member of the public, knowing all the facts concerning the judge's meeting with an employee of the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (CPS), would not have a reasonable doubt that the judge was actually impartial. The testimony of the CSP employee, who was designated as an expert witness, established that the judge wanted to obtain general information about the CPS's adoption policies and procedures; additionally, her testimony established that the meeting did not relate to the specific facts of the case. In re F.A.R., 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 234 (Tex. App. Eastland Jan. 13 2005).

 
96. In a parental rights termination case, denial of the mother's motion to recuse a judge was proper because excerpts from the record showed an associate judge who was trying to clarify the facts in a permanency hearing and to ensure that the mother appreciated the gravity of her acts and omissions. The statements occurred a month before the trial, and the mother did not point to any evidentiary rulings made by the judge that showed bias. Gammill v. Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 3800 (Tex. App. Austin May 22 2009).

 
97. Appellate court denied the State's motion to recuse an appellate justice because the tangential statements filed by the justice on behalf of his client who was not a party to a separate civil suit were insufficient, as a matter of law, to warrant recusal from consideration of the State's motion for rehearing and motion for reconsideration en banc. It was in a capacity as an advocate for his client that the justice filed the documents communicating his client's belief that the civil suit between the political opponents was "politically motivated," and no showing was made that the statements represented the justice's personal beliefs rather than merely reflecting the beliefs of his client. Ex parte Ellis, 275 S.W.3d 109, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 9722 (Tex. App. Austin 2008).
 
98. Presiding judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the inmate's motion to recuse the trial judge without a hearing, because the inmate's grounds for recusal were not valid, when even assuming the trial judge, former county district attorney, had worked with the county district attorney's office on previous criminal cases, this working relationship alone was not a ground for recusal. Clark v. Smith County Dist. Attys. Office, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 6204 (Tex. App. Tyler Aug. 10 2011).
 
99. Summary judgment in favor of the attorney, dismissing the claimant's fraudulent lien action under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ch. 12 was proper, because the justice court judge did not err by refusing to apply Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a, when Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a did not apply to justice courts, and the claimant cited no authority and presented no argument that the justice court lacked the authority to assess attorney fees against a litigant as a sanction. Merritt v. Davis, 331 S.W.3d 857, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 633 (Tex. App. Dallas 2011).

 
100. Petitioner state inmate's habeas claim that the trial judge should have recused himself under Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b due to a direct conflict of interest in violation of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct, for formerly serving on the Children's Assessment Center judicial council, failed because recusal was not warranted in a sexual assault of a child case solely because the judge had at one time been on the Center's council, it was not alleged or shown that the judge had any direct involvement with the Center during the relevant time period, and the judge's statements in ordering consecutive sentences, that it was easy to decide to lock up the inmate for life, did not show recusal was required; there was no showing of improper motive or opinion derived from an extrajudicial source. Mendez v. Quarterman, 625 F. Supp. 2d 415, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47543 (S.D. Tex. 2009).
 
101. Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to recuse another judge presiding over defendant juvenile's case because the judge testified that her sentencing decision in defendant's case had nothing to do with the judge's acquaintance with the complainant's son, and defense counsel agreed that he never questioned the judge's ability to be fair and impartial during the adjudication and disposition hearing, "except when she pronounced sentence, because it was a lot more than what I thought that defendant was going to get." In re E.A.P., 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 1536 (Tex. App. San Antonio Mar. 11 2009).
 
102. Where the losing party sought to have the authoring judge of the appellate opinion disqualified because an attorney in the law firm with which she previously practiced served as a lawyer in the instant case while the judge was practicing at the firm, the appellate court ruled that the judge was not disqualified because of a tangential association between the judge and the appeal; the association did not present constitutional or statutory grounds for disqualification and was unknown to the judge. F.S. New Prods. v. Strong Indus., 129 S.W.3d 594, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 9882 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 2003), reversed in part and remanded, Tesco Am., Inc. v. Strong Indus., Inc., No. 04-0269, 2006 Tex. LEXIS 208 (Tex. 2006) (unpublished).
 
103. Contention of a party that a judge was disqualified because she had been a lawyer at a firm during the time that a partner in that firm represented the opposing party and that Tex. R. App. P. 16.1 and Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(1)(a) required her disqualification in such a situation and that because the judge was disqualified from deciding the appeal in the matter, the judgment she rendered was a nullity and could not be given effect, was without merit because the standard under Tex. Const. art. V, § 11 for disqualifying a judge who had been counsel in the case did not incorporate the standard for disqualification set out in Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(1)(a). F.S. New Prods. v. Strong Indus., 129 S.W.3d 594, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 9882 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 2003), reversed in part and remanded, Tesco Am., Inc. v. Strong Indus., Inc., No. 04-0269, 2006 Tex. LEXIS 208 (Tex. 2006) (unpublished).
 
104. Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(1)(a) recognizes that a judge is vicariously disqualified under Tex. Const. art. V, § 11 as having been counsel in the case if a lawyer with whom the judge previously practiced law served as counsel to a party concerning the matter during their association. F.S. New Prods. v. Strong Indus., 129 S.W.3d 594, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 9882 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 2003), reversed in part and remanded, Tesco Am., Inc. v. Strong Indus., Inc., No. 04-0269, 2006 Tex. LEXIS 208 (Tex. 2006) (unpublished).
 
105. Under Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(1)(a), a trial judge was disqualified from presiding over a mother's action for modification of a parent-child relationship, because the trial judge had been the law partner of the mother's former attorney during the time that the mother's former attorney represented the mother in the initial divorce action. The same matter in controversy was involved in both proceedings. In re O'Connor, 92 S.W.3d 446, 2002 Tex. LEXIS 108, 45 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 970 (Tex. 2002).
 
106. Trial judge was not constitutionally disqualified from sitting in appellant's case involving his allegations of fraudulent liens because appellant's "Constitutional Disqualifications" stated only general allegations of bias and prejudice and did not state at least one legally recognized ground for constitutional disqualification. As a result, the presiding judge of the administrative judicial district did not abuse his discretion by denying disqualification without holding a hearing. Drum v. Calhoun, 299 S.W.3d 360, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 6627 (Tex. App. Dallas 2009).

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Time of Request: Wednesday, November 02, 2011  19:15:30 EST

Print Number:    1829:315683241
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Send To:  MAGNUSON, KENNETH
          CRAIG MAGNUSON
          4109 BUCKINGHAM PL
          COLLEYVILLE, TX 76034-4669