IN THE
NAME AND BY AUTHORITY OF
THE STATE
OF TEXAS:
I, Randall Kelton, hereinafter referred to as
"Complaint," under penalty of perjury, do state that I have personal
knowledge I have good reason to believe and do believe based upon the following
information:
Judge Fletcher, after Complainant had been released on bail
from the warrant issued by Judge Fletcher, did not recall the warrant.
Subsequently Complainant was arrested in Travis Count at the City of Austin
Municipal Court on 4th day of August 2010, and taken to the Travis
County jail. Complainant was arrested on the above referenced warrant and
taken, at virtual gunpoint, by City of Austin city marshals to the Travis
County Jail and there imprisoned. A petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed
by friends of Complainant with the Travis County District Court and instead of
hearing ordering the writ, the court released Complainant on a personal
recognizance bond where Complainant remained until trial.
The city marshals acted on good faith reliance on an
existing warrant issued under the color of authority exercised by Judge
Fletcher. In as much as there is no “false imprisonment” statute, the
allegation here is one of Kidnapping as defined by TxPC Section 20.03.
Sec. 20.03. KIDNAPPING.
(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally or
knowingly abducts another person.
(b) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under
this section that:
(1) the abduction was not
coupled with intent to use or to threaten to use deadly force;
(2) the actor was a
relative of the person abducted; and
(3) the actor's sole intent
was to assume lawful control of the victim.
(c) An offense under this section is a felony of the
third degree.
In as much as the arresting officers acted in good faith
reliance on the existence of a warrant, the act must be attributed to Judge
Fletcher.
Sec. 7.01. PARTIES TO OFFENSES.
(a) A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense
if the offense is committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for
which he is criminally responsible, or by both.
(b) Each party to an offense may be charged with
commission of the offense.
(c) All traditional distinctions between accomplices
and principals are abolished by this section, and each party to an offense may
be charged and convicted without alleging that he acted as a principal or
accomplice.
Sec. 7.02. CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONDUCT
OF ANOTHER.
(a) A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed
by the conduct of another if:
(1) acting with the kind of
culpability required for the offense, he causes or aids an innocent or
nonresponsible person to engage in conduct prohibited by the definition of the
offense;
(2) acting with intent to
promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages,
directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense; or
(3) having a legal duty to prevent
commission of the offense and acting with intent to promote or assist its
commission, he fails to make a reasonable effort to prevent commission of the
offense.
(b) If, in the attempt to carry out a conspiracy to
commit one felony, another felony is committed by one of the conspirators, all
conspirators are guilty of the felony actually committed, though having no
intent to commit it, if the offense was committed in furtherance of the
unlawful purpose and was one that should have been anticipated as a result of
the carrying out of the conspiracy.
Sec. 7.03. DEFENSES EXCLUDED.
In a prosecution in which an actor's criminal responsibility is
based on the conduct of another, the actor may be convicted on proof of
commission of the offense and that he was a party to its commission, and it is
no defense:
(1) that the actor belongs to a class of persons that
by definition of the offense is legally incapable of committing the offense in
an individual capacity; or
(2) that the person for whose conduct the actor is
criminally responsible has been acquitted, has not been prosecuted or
convicted, has been convicted of a different offense or of a different type or
class of offense, or is immune from prosecution.
Judge Fletcher, by causing a false warrant to be issued
against Complainant, is criminally responsible for the false arrest of and
subsequent imprisonment of Complainant in violation of TxPC 20.02 (supra). (see
Criminal Affidavit Section Q attached)(see Exhibit Complaint X attached)
Therefore,
I charge that heretofore, and before the making and filing of this complaint,
on or before the 26th day of November 2011, in Cherokee County and
State of Texas, Craig Foetcher, did then and there unlawfully and
willfully caused complainant to be false arrested and inprisoned, in an
act of Kidnapping as defined by Section 20.02 Texas Penal Code.
________________
Randall Kelton
113 S. Allen St.
Boyd, Tx 76023
5213 430 4140