IN THE
NAME AND BY AUTHORITY OF
THE STATE
OF TEXAS:
I, Randall Kelton, hereinafter referred to as
"Complaint," under penalty of perjury, do state that I have personal
knowledge I have good reason to believe and do believe based upon the following
information:
At the above referenced hearing, Judge Fletcher refused to
quash the complaint and information. Complainant objected to the complaint and
information claiming that there were no facts alleged. Joe Evans had just
testified to inconsistent facts.
When Evans swore to the complaint, he did so under oath and
swore that he had reason to believe that Complainant had committed the crime of
“Operating an Investigating Business Without a License.” Evans later
testified, under oath, that he had no idea what constituted a violation of the
act.
All the above was before the court when Judge Fletcher
refused to quash the complaint and information. Said act by Judge Fletcher had
the effect of furthering the act of Aggravated Perjury (TxPC Section 37.03
supra) by Evans if furtherance of the acts of Tampering With a Witness (TxPC
Section 36.05 supra) and Obstruction/Retaliation (TxPC Section 36.06 supra).
In as much as Judge Fletcher acted with full knowledge of the nature of the
acts committed, Judge Fletcher is culpable for the acts herein suborned.
Sec. 7.02. CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR
CONDUCT OF ANOTHER.
(a) A person is criminally responsible for an offense
committed by the conduct of another if:
(1) acting with the kind
of culpability required for the offense, he causes or aids an innocent or
nonresponsible person to engage in conduct prohibited by the definition of the
offense;
(2) acting with intent
to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages,
directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense; or
(3) having a legal duty
to prevent commission of the offense and acting with intent to promote or
assist its commission, he fails to make a reasonable effort to prevent
commission of the offense.
(b) If, in the attempt to carry out a conspiracy
to commit one felony, another felony is committed by one of the conspirators,
all conspirators are guilty of the felony actually committed, though having no
intent to commit it, if the offense was committed in furtherance of the
unlawful purpose and was one that should have been anticipated as a result of
the carrying out of the conspiracy.
Judge Fletcher, being learned counsel and being intimately
familiar with all the facts of the case cannot be said to have acted in good
faith. Neither can the fact that Judge Fletcher was acting in the capacity of
presiding judge be construed to shield him from the criminal responsibility for
his acts.
Sec. 7.03. DEFENSES EXCLUDED.
In a prosecution in which an actor's criminal responsibility
is based on the conduct of another, the actor may be convicted on proof of
commission of the offense and that he was a party to its commission, and it is
no defense:
(1) that the actor
belongs to a class of persons that by definition of the offense is legally
incapable of committing the offense in an individual capacity; or
(2) that the person for
whose conduct the actor is criminally responsible has been acquitted, has not
been prosecuted or convicted, has been convicted of a different offense or of a
different type or class of offense, or is immune from prosecution.
Judge Fletcher, by failing to dismiss the allegations
against Complainant in the face of clearly conflicting statements by the
complainant, acted to further the perjury committed by Evans. Judge Fletcher,
by his act in concert and collusion with the acts of Evans is equally culpable
for the crime of Aggravated Perjury, in violation of TxPC Section
37.03(supra). (see Criminal Affidavit Section EE attached)
Therefore, I charge that heretofore, and
before the making and filing of this complaint, on or before the 26th
day of November 2011, in Cherokee County and State of Texas, Craig
Fletcher, did then and there unlawfully and willfully subborn the
perjurous acts of Joe Evans when Evaqns made false and conflicting statements
of material fact under oath before Fletcher sitting as the presiding judge, in
an act of Aggravated Perjury as defined by Section 37.03 Texas Penal
Code.
_________________
Randall Kelton
PO Box 1
Boyd, Tx 76023
512 430 4140