IN THE
NAME AND BY AUTHORITY OF
THE STATE
OF TEXAS:
I, Randall Kelton, hereinafter referred to as
"Complaint," under penalty of perjury, do state that I have personal
knowledge I have good reason to believe and do believe based upon the following
information:
At the hearing held on 25th day of April 2011, at
a hearing on Defendant’s Motion to Quash Complaint and Motion to
Quash Information, Judge Fletcher, after hearing testimony from Joe Evans
wherein Evans testified that the complaint lacked facts alleged in support of
the allegations as Evans had no idea what constituted a violation. Evans
testified that he only filed the complaint because Caldwell told him that
filing a complaint with the grand jury without a private investigator’s license
was a crime.
This testimony was inconsistent with the language of the
complaint itself which was before the court.
Sec. 37.06. INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS.
An information or indictment for perjury under Section 37.02
or aggravated perjury under Section 37.03 that alleges that the declarant has
made statements under oath, both of which cannot be true, need not allege which
statement is false. At the trial the prosecution need not prove which
statement is false.
Evans’ contradictory testimony clearly demonstrated that,
either when Evans swore under oath that he had reason to believe Defendant
committed the crime of “Operating a Private Investigating Business Without a
License,” or when he testified in court that he had no idea what constituted a
violation, was aggravated perjury.
Sec. 37.03. AGGRAVATED PERJURY.
(a) A person commits an offense if he commits perjury as
defined in Section 37.02, and the false statement:
(1) is made during or in
connection with an official proceeding; and
(2) is material.
(b) An offense under this section is a felony of
the third degree.
Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1,
1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.
In as much as the complaint was issued shortly after Defendant
filed criminal charges against Judge Fletcher and Prosecutor Caldwell, it can
hardly be construed that Judge Fletcher was somehow unaware of the materiality
of the inconsistent statements made by Evans.
Sec. 37.04. MATERIALITY.
(a) A statement is material, regardless of the admissibility
of the statement under the rules of evidence, if it could have affected the
course or outcome of the official proceeding.
(b) It is no defense to prosecution under Section
37.03 (Aggravated Perjury) that the declarant mistakenly believed the statement
to be immaterial.
(c) Whether a statement is material in a given
factual situation is a question of law.
Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1,
1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1,
1994.
Evans, by his own testimony, presented conflicting
statements to the court on two separate occasions in clear violation of TxPC
Section 37.03 (supra). (see Criminal Affidavit Section DD attached)
Therefore, I charge that heretofore, and
before the making and filing of this complaint, on or before the 26th
day of November 2011, in Cherokee County and State of Texas, Joe
Evans, did then and there unlawfully and willfully make false and
conflicting statements of material fact under oath, in an act of Aggravated
Perjury as defined by Section 37.03 Texas Penal Code.
_________________
Randall Kelton
PO Box 1
Boyd, Tx 76023
512 430 4140