IN THE
NAME AND BY AUTHORITY OF
THE STATE
OF TEXAS:
I, Randall Kelton, hereinafter referred to as
"Complaint," under penalty of perjury, do state that I have personal
knowledge I have good reason to believe and do believe based upon the following
information:
After failing to properly act on the motion to disqualify
himself, Judge Fletcher, continued to makes rulings in the case.
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 18a(f) (2) Restrictions on Further Action.
(A) Motion Filed Before Evidence Offered at Trial. If a
motion is filed before evidence has been offered at trial, the respondent judge
must take no further action in the case until the motion has been decided,
except for good cause stated in writing or on the record.
See Carson v. McAdams, 908 S.W.2d 228, 228-29 (Tex. App.BHouston [1st Dist.]
1993, orig. proceeding); In re M.E.H., 2004 WL 1471092, *2 (Tex. App.BFort Worth July 1,
2004, no pet.).
Where the Complainant filed a recusal motion on September 9,
2005, in a guardianship proceeding, the orders signed by the judge after the
filing of the recusal motion violated the Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a(d) prohibition against further trial court action; these orders were void and of
no effect. In re Whatley, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 8911 (Tex. App. Houston 14th
Dist. Oct. 13 2006), abrogated by De Gonzalez v. Guilbot, 315 S.W.3d 533, 2010 Tex. LEXIS 421 (2010).
Where a trial court judge denied a motion to recuse him and
then ruled on a pending motion to recuse another judge, both orders were void;
under Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a, a judge who is the subject of a motion to
recuse cannot deny the motion or rule on whether it meets the requirements of Tex.
Gov't Code Ann. § 25.00255 but has a mandatory duty either to grant the
motion or to refer the motion to the presiding judge. In re Norman, 191
S.W.3d 858, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 3292 (Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. 2006).
Although the trial court properly forwarded the motion for
recusal to the presiding judge of the administrative district, he subsequently
dismissed the father's lawsuit for want of prosecution before the motion to
recuse was resolved, and no good cause was stated in the dismissal order;
further, since the dismissal violated the Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a(d) prohibition against further trial court action, the dismissal order was void
and of no effect. In re M.E.H., 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 5824 (Tex. App. Fort Worth July 1 2004).
Presiding judge was unaware that an administrative judge's
order denying a litigant's recusal motion was void when the presiding judge
signed two orders; because the administrative judge's orders were void given
that he proceeded despite a timely objection under Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §
74.053, the presiding judge signed his orders while the recusal motion was pending, and because he did not state in these orders that there was good cause
to act while a recusal motion was pending, for purposes of Tex. R. Civ. P.
18a(d), the presiding judge's orders were also void. Anderson v.
City of Port Arthur, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 7706 (Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. Sept. 21 2010).
Judge Fletcher, by continuing to make rulings in the case
after Complainant filed a Motion to Disqualify Judge Fletcher and
before a hearing was held on the motion, breached a statutorily mandated duty
and in the process denied Complainant in the full and free access to
Complainant’s right to the due course of the laws, in violation of TxPC
39.03(supra). The Texas Constitution sets out the grounds for disqualification
[Tex. Const. art. 5 § 11]:
No judge shall sit in any case wherein he may be
interested, or where either of the parties may be connected with him,
either by affinity or consanguinity, within such a degree as may be prescribed
by law, or when he shall have been counsel in the case. (emphasis added)
Complainant, in his Motion to Disqualify demonstrated that
Judge Fletcher had a personal interest in the instant cause as, one month prior
to the issuance of the warrant for the arrest of Complainant, Complainant had
made criminal allegations against Judge Fletcher, to the Cherokee County Grand
Jury. Judge Fletcher had a strong personal interest in keeping Complainant
from acting as a witness before the grand jury concerning the criminal
allegations brought by Complainant.
Judge Fletcher, by continuing to make rulings in the case
after Complainant’s Motion to Disqualify Judge Fletcher was filed in the court
exercised an authority specifically denied to him by the clear language of
TxCCP 18a(f), and in so doing denied Complainant in the due course of the laws
in violation of TxPC Section 39.03. (see Criminal Affidavit Section CC attached)
Therefore,
I charge that heretofore, and before the making and filing of this complaint,
on or before the 26th day of November 2011, in Cherokee County and
State of Texas, Craig Fletcher did then and there unlawfully and
willfully exert an authoirty not granted to him by the Legislature and in
the proess denied Complainant in Complainant’s right to the due course of the
laws of the State of Texas, in an act of Official Oppression as
defined by Section 39.03 Texas Penal Code.
________________
Randall Kelton
113 S. Allen St.
Boyd, Tx 76023
5213 430 4140